For Husserl, to address these kinds of questions requires not only an understanding of what is entailed by a particular historical or political situation; it also requires pursuing the philosophical task of moving beyond the situation in order to formulate a kind of sense of sense, or the meaning of meaning that will provide the basis for a global understanding of the conditions of being situated in the world, in history as such.
In other words, the need for an answer to the question of what is meaningful and meaningless can be traced ultimately to the need for a world, a world both stable and comprehensible that can serve as a foundation for a response to the question of who and what we are. This need can be addressed by philosophical reflection only to the extent to which such reflection accomplishes a formation of sense, or only to the extent to which reflection matures into critique, as was explored in the Introduction. To be sure, this needs to be more precise: in what way does the formation of sense in turn fashion the world?
Invoking the idea of science as technology, or the knowledge of how to manipulate and construct, does not really answer the question; the very possibility of technology is dependent upon the prior accomplishment of science in its articulation of the world. Science does not only provide homo faber with instruments; it is itself an already constructed experience of the world that infuses all such instruments with their sense.
The answer has to do with the manner in which the accomplishments of sense-formation are instituted, or the manner in which meaning is not simply fashioned but is constitutive of The Concept of Crisis 33 a possibility of manifestation, or world-disclosure. In the Introduction, it was argued that science must be seen as an already accomplished reflection on the world; it was also indicated that this accomplishment is not limited to the formation of sense alone, but includes an institution of sense in the wake of what reflection reveals to be possible.
By articulating a sense of sense, science, or better the claim of science, articulates how to make a world manifest, or visible. Consider a passage from a lecture Husserl gave in May of in Vienna, at the invitation of the Wiener Kulturbund. That we live in our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of all our cares and endeavors—this refers to a fact that occurs purely within the spiritual realm.
Our surrounding world is a spiritual structure [geistiges Gebilde] in us and in our historical life. Thus there is no reason for him who makes spirit as spirit his subject matter to demand anything other than a purely spiritual explanation for it. And so generally: to look upon the nature of the surrounding world as something alien to the spirit, and consequently to want to buttress humanistic science with natural science so as to make it supposedly exact, is absurd.
What is obviously also completely forgotten is that natural science like all science generally is a title for spiritual accomplishments, namely, those of the natural scientists working together; as such they belong, after all, like all spiritual occurrences, to the region of what is to be explained by humanistic disciplines.
Furthermore, the ontological laws that govern these relations remain obscure until a level of analysis has been reached that corresponds neither to the ontological region of spirit nor to that of nature, but to that of lived experience, the elaboration of which inaugurates a new perspective on the problem of the world over and above the ontologies of its different regions. The world of the Greeks could have been what it was only had the Greeks lived through it the way that they did. However, the point is not that the Greeks created a world, or even re-created a world they had found; the idea is more general, namely that the manner in which things take shape in experience always carries with it a sense of accomplishment characteristic of the mode in which things can be encountered.
It is only from within the movement of an accomplishing experience that a subject can be aware of, and in this way encounter, anything at all; the dynamics of structuring, assembling, combining, holding-together, forming, even analyzing wholes is the very manner in which the world unfolds as a unity of meaning. Events always, more or less, result in something. All expectation, for example, is grounded in this fundamental understanding of the world as result, as accomplished being in this sense. Alternatively, in the language proposed in the Introduction, the possibility of being in the grip of a meaning is conditioned by the capacity to be the subject for whom the world progressively takes shape in the accomplishment of an understanding of it.
The intuitive sense of the concrete refers to the embodiment of the world in experience; it characterizes that givenness of self which the world can assume only from within the activity of lived understanding, thus within its construction in accordance with a form and idea that belong to the particular articulateness of a lived experience.
It is the result of the exercise of the capacity to be open to a manner in which the world can take shape in the understanding. Anything less could not be called an accomplishment of an understanding, of the spirit. For what does understanding, as an act, seek to do? For Husserl, the answer can only be the accomplishment of sense, which is again not merely a picture or even an interpretation, but an openness towards a particular mode of manifestation.
Even the interest in the abstractions of mathematical logic ultimately rests on an interest in the world, the world as it is; the idea that we seek out abstractions for their own sake, out of some innate curiosity of a reason easily seduced by the fairy tales of the non-real, is for Husserl nonsense—genuine thinking, as with all dealings and directedness towards the sphere of mean- The Concept of Crisis 37 ing, is possible only in the wake of a world-interest. The accomplishment of understanding thus does not simply present or conceive a truth, but places the subject, so to speak, in its presence, in its midst.
Science, in other words, articulates the truth of the world in which we live: when we want to get closer to things, to understand them better, the claim of science determines the horizon of our approach.
Objectivism and its devaluation of the subjective is more than just a theoretical project, it is a tendency within modern life itself, namely the tendency to orient understanding around those features of the given surrounding world that are compatible with the understanding of the world as objective.
Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment? For Husserl, these difficulties point to a deeper life-crisis of European humanity, one that has led to the uninhabitability of the world, not because there is something that cannot be understood, but because in objectivism, understanding itself, at the height of its influence and power to shape the surrounding world, has lost its footing, giving rise to an existential crisis about the possibility of the very decision it represents for human existence—the decision about what is to count as meaningful and meaningless.
The employment of the very means by which humanity is to find its place in the world has led to its exile. Is there, in view of their constant successes, a crisis of the sciences? The success of science is left intact; the question instead has to do with the implications and effect this success has had on a humanity that is dependent on its understanding in order to live. Yet the restrictions emphasized by an objectivism that seeks to articulate the sense of this success are too severe, its language too alien to be able to address humanity in a way that can be comprehended; as human beings, we do not understand what science says when it speaks to us, thus in an important sense what the world says to us through our experience of it through science.
When, and because of what did we lose our home? In the scene in Faust in which this line appears, Mephistopheles, impersonating the despondent Faust,25 is conducting an interview with a student who is trying to decide which course of study he should pursue. After Mephistopheles, somewhat to his irritation, fails to seduce the student with logic and metaphysics, the latter confesses that he is not much inclined towards jurisprudence either.
The laws and statutes of a nation Are an inherited disease, From generation to generation And place to place they drag on by degrees. Wisdom becomes nonsense; kindness, oppression: To be a grandson is a curse. The right that is innate in us Is not discussed by the profession. The contrast is a familiar philosophical gesture. There is a difference between what the world has because of its history and what the subject has because of its nature.
And though these two sides are in some sense independent, it is not as if they had nothing to do with one another; there is always a need, or a demand, however obscure its formulation, that the innate sense of right be satisfied with whatever historical or traditional manifestation justice actually takes. Not that our innate sense is necessarily present The Concept of Crisis 41 as a clearly articulated standard or norm; it is enough to be aware merely of the difference between the ideal and the real, and to understand that whatever may begin as something close to the ideal wisdom, kindness, good intentions more often than not turns, given enough history, into something closer to its opposite.
The articulation of the crisis is guided by a sensitivity to the difference between the ideal of science and its historical manifestation, i. The innate sense of right is, as innate, implicitly timeless; what comes innate is not passed on as something inherited, which means that every given historical subject has an equal share in the resources implicit in the innate. Historical becoming continuously fashions the possible, setting it up in different ways, and that is no less true with respect to the possible senses of an ideal. Likewise, the originary development of scientific culture, in the wake of its idea, opens a world of possibilities that had been dormant or nonexistent prior to the original intuition of the idea as the event of original institution, in which the idea first becomes a motivating factor in history.
On the contrary, the ideal itself, or the manner in which the motivation of the idea actually plays itself out, is one of the things being decided when faced with a possibility of interpretation. This means that the critique of the idea of science, as a Besinnung, is for Husserl necessarily an historical reflection, not in order to trace a traditional inheritance back to an original, pure idea, but to uncover the historical possibility of the origin taking hold as such—again.
The crisis expressed in the tendency of objectivism is also an historical phenomenon, which means that it owes its force to its concretization The Concept of Crisis 43 within a tradition. Objectivism is a tendency within a concrete articulation, thus realization of the idea of science, and as such represents, in principle, a kind of risk; for realizations always put at risk original intentions.
More, this risk goes beyond problems that arise due to the specific limitations and restrictions of objectivism; the deeper question is what has been closed off once these restrictions of objectivism tend to be accepted, that is, once they no longer represent provisional experiments with the idea but have become a tradition of successful practices. What is at stake when a tendency like objectivism takes hold in the context of a developing history is the very openness of possibility. The rise of objectivism represents a phase of the historical development of what is possible in the wake of the idea of reason, and as such, it initiates the necessity of the preservation of the possible beyond the limits of what it itself has made real.
Yet, and this is an insight that Husserl gradually develops in his reflections between and , this would be true of any historical realization of the idea, and cannot be attributed to the consequences of objectivism alone. However, in its traditional form, a law is a decision we inherit. As such, the law has already shaped certain possibilities with respect to a particular question again by way of a process of exclusion: some are rejected, others accepted, some left undefined.
In effect, even if what we decide does not fall outside of the well-defined constraints of legal tradition, we must nevertheless still decide again, and in making such decisions we have an impact not only on the particular case, but on the meaning of the definition or law itself, on the 44 Chapter One horizon of possible comprehension that had been originally put into place by and as the tradition.
For however established, this horizon is not immutable, since we must in every case make it our own. A crisis is thus dangerous and decisive at the same time, and the word can be used to express the danger, or the risk, inherent to a decision. It is also an experience of necessity: a crisis is a situation where we can go no further, or carry on no longer, without a fundamental change; for better or for worse, in a crisis a decision must be made, it is a danger that must be resolved.
The word itself is Greek krisis , and can mean: a a division, or a conflict; but also b a decision, or a judgment. Both senses can be operative at the same time, as when one refers to a judgment that can end a conflict, or which takes a final position within a conflict without necessarily bringing it to a close. Yet medicine is not the only sphere of life in which this word has been traditionally used.
It has also found its way into politics, and very early on. And in the political use of krisis, particularly in the case of Aristotle, the same meanings are at play, but with a somewhat different effect, The Concept of Crisis 45 given in part the difference in subject matter. In particular, in Aristotle there is an interesting double sense of krisis that only here takes on an important role. There is also a natural reference here to conflict, insofar as political decisions are occasioned by conflicts, great or small; authority defined without reference to conflict is meaningless.
It is precisely here, with respect to the issue of political choice, where this word takes on a curious double meaning. It can mean the task of decision itself, the burden shouldered; but it can also mean the circumstances that brought about, or called for, the shouldering of the burden. Thus, presumably, for Aristotle the citizen is not only defined as the one who has the function of making decisions, but also as the one who is concerned with whatever question or conflict requires the polis to make a decision.
That is, the citizen is the one for whom it is necessary that a decision be made, just as much as it is the citizen who makes the decision. First the distinction, which is apparently missing in Aristotle, or at least not emphasized: critique, as opposed to crisis, need not be understood as anything more than a reflective assessment of a situation in which the 46 Chapter One critic is either not involved at all, or is at least not involved while assuming the mantle of critic. The critic, to be a critic, need not be the one who assumes the authority, understood in the modern context as the right, to a make a decision.
To be sure, citizens exercise critique, they make circumspective judgments about what is just and unjust; but such critique is always at the same time a participation in the actual institution of justice from within the actual development of crisis. There is an absence of the modern motivation to distinguish between one who chooses and the one who has to make a choice. Is it guided by the modern distinction between the two, or does the participation in one necessarily entail participation in the other? In the Renaissance, the expression of the ideal of science somehow falters; the highest ideal of the rational no longer functions effectively in the ordering of the human lived world.
This would be nothing less than a call for a new Renaissance, one intended to supplant the ideals of the old Renaissance with a new understanding of the idea of reason. And it would do this by bringing the European spirit once again into contact with the original sense of the idea of science, something the history of scientific culture itself has obfuscated, thereby making the possibility of shaping the world from within the horizon of reason once again a living possibility.
And philosophy would be in a position to do this, precisely because of the relative independence of critique with respect to crisis: critique is the calm, intellectual penetration into what is possible and not possible, where assertions are not really decisions, but descriptions of what kinds of decisions would or could find a place and a function in the situation of crisis.
The philosopher would be like the doctor giving recommendations, formulating diagnoses and dispensing dietary suggestions to the patient, who in turn would be the one at a crossroads, a turning point where a decision must be made. The resources that enable us to care, to be concerned for the city, are the same as those that enable us to make decisions on its behalf. Such a reflection would thus not be limited to a diagnosis of the crisis, but on the contrary its intensification and, above all, its very manifestation. To illustrate, take the following passage from Part I of the Crisis: A definite ideal of a universal philosophy and its method forms the beginning; this is, so to speak, the primal establishment of the philosophical modern age and all its lines of development.
But instead of being able to work itself out in fact, this ideal suffers an inner dissolution. As against attempts to carry out and newly fortify the ideal, this dissolution gives rise to revolutionary, more or less radical innovations. Thus the problem of the genuine ideal of universal philosophy and its genuine method now actually becomes the innermost driving force of all historical philosophical movements. But this is to say that, ultimately, all modern sciences drifted into a peculiar, increasingly puzzling crisis with regard to the meaning of their original founding as branches of philosophy, a meaning The Concept of Crisis 49 which they continued to bear within themselves.
This is a crisis which does not encroach upon the theoretical and practical successes of the special sciences; yet it shakes to the foundation the whole meaning of their truth. Notice that at no point is the argument that the ideal of science was ever non-problematic. On the contrary: […] in its [i.
Yet in the very attempt to fulfill it, the naive obviousness of this task is increasingly transformed—as one feels already in the ancient systems—into unintelligibility. Husserl in these pages is pointing to another kind of breakdown that is not an exception, but an ever-present possibility and partial reality of a life in reason, a permanent risk inherent to any form that the realization or fulfillment of the meaning of science can take in life.
Perhaps the point is to recognize that there has never been a situation in which the idea of science was not on some level an issue, a conviction always being pushed perilously close to doubt, where the obviousness of the idea always 50 Chapter One at the same time masks a failure to break through that very obviousness, justifying itself so as to ward off the specter of its own unintelligibility. To engage in crisis and critique is not somehow to respond in an exceptional way to an exceptional situation, e.
The Concept of Crisis 51 However, these two senses of crisis are really not distinguishable, once we think of the conflict itself is the shape that has been assumed by an understanding of the world. Looked at this way, critical understanding is not something brought to bear on the crisis of the times, it is the crisis of our times, not merely a symptom but a manifestation of its very essence.
And the exercise of critique, as an intellectual gesture, is simply another expression of being in a crisis, which is in turn for Husserl being concerned with the possibilities encountered in the wake of a commitment to the ideal of reason, including the possibility of its impossibility. Above all, on the second reading it would make little sense to understand critique as a cure for the crisis of the sciences, as if there were such a thing as a special, philosophical therapy that would remove altogether the questionableness of science.
To be sure, science as an infinite movement of world-discovery would remain as a task, but the meaning of this movement as a whole would be a firm acquisition arrived at by transcendental philosophy. From the latter perspective, the opening of the world to understanding in the form of the true is never simply positive, but is always at the same time the opening of an experience of the questionableness of the world.
On this reading, if crisis is a disease, it is one for which there is no cure, critique or not; it would be like calling life itself a disease. Then what would political action be, for a life in which there was no choice-saturated krisis—would this not, on the contrary, imply that such a life would have no need for political action, that virtue had been replaced by algorithmic mechanisms of decision without a hint of risk?
This second reading would also allow for a formulation of the motivation for a reflection on the meaning of science, in answer to the question posed above at the end of the Introduction. If crisis is not simply a singular event in time, but belongs to the structure of the realization of the idea of science in history, then this strongly suggests that the questionableness of science in turn belongs to its very sense. If it is a viable interpretation, then one could argue that, for Husserl, what motivates reflection to ask what is possible, or what can be revealed about the possibility of science as such, is not something external to the meaning of science, but must be understood as a structural moment of this meaning itself.
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To engage the meaning of science would be to engage it in its very The Concept of Crisis 53 questionableness; to make the meaning of science clear, to articulate it and thus to expose oneself to its driving force—all of this entails a maturation of a sensitivity not only for the claim of science, but for the problematic character of this claim. This would mean that the sense of crisis is essential for the reflective engagement with the claim of science; it does not drive us away from the hold of the ideal, but on the contrary contains its secret. In our philosophizing, then—how can we avoid it?
The quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of mankind; the latter is, necessarily, being toward the telos and can only come to realization, if at all, through philosophy—through us, if we are philosophers in all seriousness. If not, what should we, who believe, do in order to be able to believe?
We cannot seriously continue our previous philosophizing; it lets us hope only for philosophies, never for philosophy. The philosopher has a function, apparently, to administer to the developing cultural whole of humankind. Yet if we were to ask how such an administration would function, that is, how it is that the functionary would function, we come up against a tendency towards the second reading. For the question of the philosopher is not simply the question of humankind alone, but first and foremost of a self, of whoever reflects.
And the question of the philosopher is above all that of the possibility of philosophy, which is something confronting the philosopher as a task of existence—though, to be sure, it is again a task that has implications beyond the individuality of the one who reflects, carrying with it significance for the telos of humanity as a whole.
Alternatively, as Husserl puts it, this task will have significance only if we take it up, if we recognize the possibility of philosophy as that for which we ourselves are responsible. Following this line of reflection, the last three sentences of the passage above can perhaps begin to become clearer. To be a philosopher is not simply to take on a task, through some act of will; one does not believe only thanks to the will.
Questions of belief are more complicated. However, this re-birth is already inscribed in the belief itself, as part of its foundational structure; it makes us, who believe, able to The Concept of Crisis 55 believe. A decision for or against a belief conceived in isolation from this world-forming function of understanding, where such a belief becomes the object of an act of faith that takes place in some inner space of subjectivity, is out of the question.
The point is instead to pursue a possibility within an unfolding, historical understanding of the world, within reason as that which has historically formed the world in which we live—above all perhaps within the cultural milieu of a Gelehrtenrepublik—and to engage understanding on this level, the level of the question of the origin of the world as such, is to engage in the very possibility of a belief in reason. All of this is very far indeed from the spirit of the initial question with which Husserl begins his first installment of the Crisis for the Belgrade journal Philosophia in —that is, the spirit of the scientist who, shrugging his shoulders in disbelief, asks: where is this crisis?
Furthermore, it is arguably the most important concept of Part II of the Crisis, and its thematization eventually leads to the possibility of transcendental phenome- 56 Chapter One nology itself. Thus in this sense it is necessary to return to the question Husserl poses in the beginning about whether there is truly a crisis at all; or at least return to it by reflecting on the significance of the fact that the crisis can be something hidden, latent—despite the fact that it is always present as a structural moment of the meaning of science, as I would like to argue is the case.
In answer to the question how a reflection on the meaning of science as such could be motivated, the second reading proposed above, which will guide the rest of this study, suggests that reflection itself belongs to a natural progression of an awareness of the crisis of reason, of the growing necessity of asking the question whether that in which we believe is in fact possible at all. Hua XXIX Often the argument will be that the crisis of science is due to the failure of science to take into account the lifeworld. For a nuanced reading that comes closer to the one presented here, see R.
It should simply be recognized that, politically, both Husserl and Fink were conservative German nationalists of a particular kind, and that they were at their philosophical best where they left their political sentiments out of the picture. Nevertheless, the world is not produced by consciousness in the literal sense, even if its manifestation is nevertheless a transcendental achievement of consciousness. He does see Crisis 51; Hua VI , but the question of just in what sense science is a distortion of the world of experience is hardly settled.
The point is not that concepts distort life instead of explaining it; that is a relatively trivial issue. The real question is the place and function of such distortions—this is what is to be accounted for in the Crisis through a reflection on the concreteness of life. Concrete life will be the point of departure for the explanation of its own distortion. It is just that Husserl rejects that it could be satisfying philosophically to think of thinking as a game. That is, where science is an example of a valuation, an ordering of the world, that devalues itself, negating its own effort to be that which provides life with the world in which it can exist.
No will to power here. Husserl is open to the possibility that the task of re-establishing a living connection to the ideal of science, thus to its inwardly motivating telos, is attainable by recourse to genetic questions not because practitioners of science in the past were closer to this ideal, but because the genetic-historical mode of questioning itself is conducive from our perspective towards attaining the goal of originality. This issue will be the central concern of Chapter Four, below. The crisis is a decisive moment that occurs within a belief that is already given—the choice of acceptance or non-acceptance occurs in the context of grace, within which the ability to accept has already been given to man by God.
Augustine, Confessions, ch. See also Politics a and Nicomachean Ethics a Which already raises questions. Not that phenomenology is skepticism, but because the historical significance of skepticism represents an initial, if flawed rejection of naivete. Also see the discussion by A. Political action, in the freedom of an exposed humanity that is no longer confined in the natural rhythms of the family, is itself a grasp of the nature of the whole in its ur-manifestation as polemos: strife, conflict.
The theme of Part I has not been left behind, as long as the concept of crisis is understood to be a contribution to the description of the historical character of the idea of reason. Moreover, it could be argued that it is in fact the positive character of the crisis that is the real theme in Part II, and which constitutes perhaps the most difficult insight pursued by Husserl in these paragraphs.
In what way does an idea owe its manifestation to history, such that it makes sense to approach it in an historical reflection, as opposed to a purely conceptual reflection? An expression is something the actual realization of which is guided by an approach to an idea. Perfection is manifest in the progressive being-perfected of an expression.
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By no means does this imply that perfection is thereby excluded from playing a role in understanding the meaning of science, nor does it mean that perfection has no existence; the point is only that there is never a clean, unambiguous presence of the idea, where it would stand as its own unambiguous exemplar. All of this of course raises many questions. Greek science, for Husserl, can be said to represent a Stiftung, insofar as it is the store of wisdom upon which the entire edifice of European thought and culture is established or founded.
Greek science is a founding, to be sure, and even a foundation, but these need not be taken in the sense of a gathered basis, or a static reservoir of wisdom in which basic principles have been secured. The temptation to reconfigure the metaphor in architectural terms should be resisted. The reason for a project is its original motivation, the grasp of purpose used to chart out a particular course of development, and which can be refreshed at any subsequent phase; whereas the foundation of a building is forever what it first is, an immobility that functions as the key support for an entire structure.
Greek science founds, to use other language, the task of science; it does not merely support the results of science by securing its premises. This aspect can be emphasized by thinking of a task as an activity that has been given weight thanks to a call for it to be performed. As assigned, the task is in part the expression of this call, which, giving weight to the assignment, is the origin of a kind of necessity. Possibility, in other words, can be in motion in the assignment before it has settled into a fixed definition, which also means that an establishment can be open to renewal.
This also provides another expression for the existential themes that play such a conspicuous role in Part I of the Crisis: before it is decided what we must be, even before the possibility of being has been fixed or determined, necessity, thanks to the assignment of a task, has already made it possible for us to be at all; in an important sense it makes possible before any sense in which it is decided what, in being so necessitated, it is thereby necessary to be.
When Husserl inquires into the possibility of the task of philosophy, I would argue, he has both of these senses of necessity in mind, and in the order of this distinction: it is first a question of a calling, a vocation, that makes philosophical life possible at all, setting it into motion as a possibility of existence; then, and only then, is it a question of being compelled by what is necessarily implied in the very calling of the task, as it gradually becomes clear in its unfolding just what it is to be.
Nevertheless, the assignment of a task alone is nothing historical. Yet, by itself this does not mean that the task that has been assigned is a specifically historical task. Historical tasks are shouldered only by historical persons. Thus something more is needed in order to bring the theme of history to bear; for it is not the case that the mere sense of having been assigned a task can only be made evident if we reflect on ourselves as beings who exist not only in time, but in history as well.
Thus, history truly first comes into play only once our relation to that which has been assigned to us has been experienced as a peculiar kind of problem. In fact, with respect to the task of science, this relation, according to Husserl, is not a simple, unmediated relation of being addressed. It is not, in other words, one choice among others, that may be taken up or not; we cannot remain indifferent.
This is because the call, for Husserl, is on the inside, insofar as what we are, or who we already are, is an essential part of understanding what is meant by the call, or how it is that we stand in relation to the possibility of pursuing such a task at all. Carl Stumpf in 19th Century Philosophy.
Husserl: Critique of Psychologism in Continental Philosophy. Logic and Philosophy of Logic. Husserl: Horizonality in Continental Philosophy. Husserl: Lifeworld in Continental Philosophy. Phenomenology, Misc in Continental Philosophy. Brentano: Intentionality in 19th Century Philosophy. Husserl: Logical Investigations in Continental Philosophy. I give a survey of his mathematical background and other important influences especially Bolzano. The article contains a short exposition on Husserl's distinction between proper and symbolic presentations in the "Philosophie der Arithmetik" and between finite and infinite symbolic collections.
In this text Husserl gives a detailed account of infinity, using surrogate presentations. The conclusion is that with surrogates we can only operate according to blind psychological rules. Phenomenology in Continental Philosophy. The Infinite in Philosophy of Mathematics. The article shows the affinity of Simmel's formal sociology with Husserl's notion of eidetic science.
This thesis is demonstrated by the corroboration of Simmel's revision of neo-Kantian epistemology for sociology with Husserl's phenomenology, and the parallel discussion of Simmel and Husserl concerning cognitive levels and exact and morphological eide. Simmel's analysis of dyads is explored as an exemplar of his eidetic insights. An important consequence of this demonstration is the vindication establishing the scientific legitimacy of Simmel's methodology regarding the sociology Woven throughout is discussion concerning the doctrine of the complementarity of eidetic and empirical science.
Simmel's methodology is shown to have been ahead of its time through conjoining these two modes of scientific investigation. Husserl, Miscellaneous in Continental Philosophy.
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State of affairs Sachverhalt is one of the few terms in philosophy, which only came into use for the first time in the twentieth century, mainly via the works of Husserl and Wittgenstein. This makes the task of finding out who introduced this concept into philosophy, and in exactly what sense, of considerable interest. Our thesis is that Lotze introduced the term in in the sense of the objective content of judgments, which is ipso facto the minimal structured ontological We would argue against authors such as Michael Dummett and Barry Smith, who have tried to prove that Lotze's theory of judgment, and so of states of affairs, was ad-vanced in the wake of psychologism.
Facts and States of Affairs in Metaphysics. Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. One involves comparing Husserl with Russell, and not, as has been the usual practice, with Frege.
Moreover, this approach discloses two chief grounds of relatedness between the middle Husserl and the middle Russell. The second consists of common elements shared by their epistemologies and philosophies of mind. Bertrand Russell in 20th Century Philosophy. Husserl and Analytic Philosophers in Continental Philosophy. Husserl: Epistemology, Misc in Continental Philosophy.
In his fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl intensely scrutinizes three possible significations of the concept of consciousness. In these analyses, he also strives to clearly delineate between two types of consciousness: psychological and phenomenological. The goal of this paper is to show that the way in which the psychical act is conceived and defined, according to the Husserlian approach, as a lived, intentional experience plays an essential role in clarifying the distinction between the empirical-psychological level of consciousness where the act as Moreover, I shall try to argue that the notion of act conceived in this manner had influenced and decisively determined the development of the entire Husserlian phenomenology and theory of knowledge exactly because it explains how knowledge in general is constituted from an objective point of view.
Another highly relevant distinction that needs to be dealt with in this context is the difference that Husserl establishes between the descriptive and intentional contents of the act. I shall try to show that this distinction presupposes in fact a previous conceptual determination of the noema undertaken jointly with the analysis of the noetical components of consciousness at this level , and that the way in which the relationship between these two strands of consciousness is described determines further and in a fundamental manner the development of the idea of intentionality itself.
Husserl: Philosophy of Logic in Continental Philosophy. Edmund Husserl, known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. A prolific scholar, he explored an enormous landscape of philosophical subjects, including philosophy of math, logic, theory of meaning, theory of consciousness and intentionality, and ontology in addition to phenomenology.
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